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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the District Court’s decision

upholding the approval by the BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS of FRANK AND CAROL LINSCOTT’S (and INTERSTATE
CONCRETE AND ASPHALT’S) conditional use permit application,

Bonner County File No. C1015—18, to relocate INTERSTATE’S

existing asphalt batch plant to the LINSCOTT’S existing and
active sand and gravel pit in the Sagle area of Bonner County,
Idaho.

FRANK AND CAROL LINSCOTT (herein “LINSCOTTS”) are applicants
and the owners of the real property which received the

Conditional Use Permit approval.

The LINSCOTTS own several

contiguous parcels of real property in the Sagle area of Bonner
County, Idaho.

property.

The LINSCOTTS make many uses of their real

The LINSCOTTS reside upon their real property, operate

a sand and gravel pit business, and own several structures which

are leased out for commercial use.

The LINSCOTTS have been

operating the commercial extraction of sand and gravel from their

pit for numerous decades and their operations commenced prior to
any Bonner County zoning ordinances.

INTERSTATE CONCRETE

&

ASPHALT COMPANY (herein “INTERSTATE”)

is an applicant and leases real property from LINSCOTTS and

obtains material from LINSCOTTS for some of its operations.
INTERSTATE, pursuant to several Bonner County issued special use
permits, has temporarily operated an asphalt plant upon the
LINSCOTTS’ real property at various times.

CITIZENS AGAINST LINSCOTT/INTERSTATE ASPHALT PLANT (herein
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“CITIZENS AGAINST”) purports to be “an unincorporated non—profit

association organized under the laws of the State of Idaho, whose
members include several neighbors owning property and living in
the immediate vicinity of the proposed asphalt plant.”

CITIZENS

AGAINST entity does not own any real property in the vicinity of
the proposed asphalt plant.

The CITIZENS AGAINST entity was

first identified at some point after the application was made for

and after the proceedings had commenced on the conditional use
permit, but no manager has been identified of record and there is
no filing with Idaho Secretary of State which is able to be

identified.

II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On August

8,

2018, LINSCOTTS and INTERSTATE filed a

Conditional Use Permit Application (Exhibits R. p. 8—23/Agency R.
p.

1—16)

for approval, with conditions, to relocate INTERSTATE’S

batch plant from within the City of Sandpoint to the LINSCOTTS’
sand and gravel pit real property.

The Application was processed

by the Bonner County Planning Department (Exhibits R. p. 8—
23/Agency R. p. 1—16).

The Bonner County Planning and Zoning

Commission approved the Conditional Use Permit Application on

November 15, 2018.

The approval decision letter was issued by

the Planning Department on November 16, 2018

(Exhibits R. p.

1021—1029/Agency R. p. 1008—1016).
The Planning and Zoning Commission decision was appealed to
the Bonner County Board of County Commissioners by a letter(s)

dated and received December 11, 2018 by the Bonner County
Planning Department (Exhibits R. p. 1129—1135/Agency R. p. 1115—
INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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1121).

The letter was purportedly signed by various persons

without identifying any specific land ownership status.
The Bonner County Board of County Commissioners upon the
appeal, approved the Conditional Use Permit Application on

January 11, 2019.

The approval decision letter was issued by the

Planning Department on January 14, 2019 (Exhibits R. p. 1012—
1020/Agency R. p. 999—1007).
The Board of County Commissioners decision was the subject
of a purported request for reconsideration by a letter dated and

received January 24, 2019 by the Bonner County Planning

Department (Exhibits R. p. 1039-1128/Agency R. p. 1025 — 1114).
The letter is not actually signed by anyone and does not

specifically identify the actual person(s) with asserted standing
seeking reconsideration.

Nonetheless, Bonner County proceeded

with a limited proceeding on reconsideration.
The Bonner County Board of County Commissioners upon the

reconsideration, upheld the approval of the Conditional Use

Permit Application on March 22, 2019.

The reconsideration

decision letter was issued by the Planning Department on March
25, 2019

(Exhibits R. p. 1001-1011/Agency R. p. 988-998).

On Friday April 19, 2019, at 2:36 p.m. PST, user

garyallen@givenspursley.com, by Envelope No. 1703359 submitted a

document identified as a Petition For Judicial Review on behalf
of CITIZENS AGAINST, which was rejected on Monday April 22, 2019

with directions for copying the envelope, correcting, and
resubmitting to retain the original filing date.

Said rejection

notice was emailed by the system to the user

garyallen@givenspursley.com (iCourt filing system; Clerk’s R. p.
INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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66—74, 77).

On May

1,

2019, at 12:03 p.m. PST, user

garyallen@givenspursley.com, by iCourt Envelope No. 1716343
(without copying or submitting for attempted relation back to the

prior attempted filing date, and without submitting a basis to be

excused therefrom) submitted a Petition For Judicial Review on
behalf of CITIZENS AGAINST, which was accepted on May

2019 at

1,

1:36 p.m. PST, and thereby filed on May 1, 2019 (iCourt filing

system; Clerk’s R. p. 8—15).

The District Court proceeded on the Petition For Judicial

Review Of Agency Action, electronically filed on May
(Clerk’s R. p. 8—15).
R.

p.

16—17).

A Summons was issued May

1,

1,

2019

2019 (Clerk’s

Following motion practice, briefing, and argument,

the District Court affirmed the BONNER COUNTY Board of County

Commissioners’

(herein “BONNER COUNTY”) approval of the

Conditional Use Permit (Clerk’s R. p. 285—295).
CITIZENS AGAINST then filed on March 30, 2020 this further
appeal of the approval (Clerk’s R. p. 296—315) appealing the

decision of the District Court.
320), INTERSTATE

LINSCOTTS (Clerk’s R. p. 316—

(Clerk’s R. p. 321-329) and BONNER COUNTY

(Clerk’s R. p. 326—329)

filed cross appeals as to adverse

portions of the District Court’s decision.

III. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS

The LINSCOTTS own several contiguous parcels of real

property in the Sagle area of Bonner County, Idaho.

Those

parcels include Bonner County Parcel No. RP56N02W104202A,

consisting of approximately 139.3 acres.

Most of that parcel is

INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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zoned as Rural 5 (R—5) and a portion of the parcel adjacent to
U.S. Highway 95 is zoned Commercial

(C)

(Exhibits R. p. 8—22,

255—264, 243—254, 1171-1197/Agency R. p. 1-16, 245-254, 233—244,

1156—1182).

The property has been owned by the LINSCOTT family

since 1953 and title was acquired by FRANK and CAROL LINSCOTT in
1981 from Frank’s father Norman Linscott (Warranty Deed

Instrument No. 239624 recorded March 12, 1981 records of Bonner
County, Idaho and Correction To Warranty Deed Instrument No.

255375 recorded May 20, 1982, records of Bonner County, Idaho)
(Exhibits R. p. 23/Agency R. p. 16).

The portion of the real

property subject to the application to operate an asphalt batch

plant is within the Rural zone used for sand and gravel pit
extraction by LINSCOTTS. The commercially zoned portion of the
real property adjacent to U.S. Highway 95 has numerous buildings

constructed thereon which are leased to third party commercial
tenants, and are not used in the gravel pit operation (Exhibits
R.

p.

8—22, 255—264, 243-254, 1171-1197/Agency R. p. 1—16, 245—

254, 233—244, 1156—1182).

To the north of the real property which is the subject of
the Conditional Use Permit Application, LINSCOTTS own Bonner

County Parcel No. RP56N02W103000A, consisting of approximately
74.61 acres, which is zoned as Rural 5 (R—5).
(and his former spouse)

FRANK LINSCOTT

acquired the property in 1965 (Warranty

Deed Instrument No. 104293 recorded December 21, 1965, records of
Bonner County, Idaho).

The LINSCOTTS reside on the eastern

portion of the real property and use the property for sand and
gravel extraction.

This parcel is not a subject of the

Conditional Use Permit Application at issue in this proceeding.
INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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The LINSCOTTS (and Frank Linscott’s father Norman) have

continuously conducted sand and gravel extraction on the real

property subject to the Conditional Use Permit Application since
1953.

The LINSCOTTS have continuously conducted sand and gravel

extraction on the real property located north of the real

property subject to the Conditional Use Permit Application since
1965.

The LINSCOTTS conducted sand and gravel extraction from

both parcels since prior to Bonner County adopting a zoning
ordinance.
The assertions in the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST in its

Petitioner’s Opening Brief, pages

9 -

15, part C.

Statement of

Facts, 2. History of Permitting on the Property, 3. Expansion of
the Gravel Pit After 1981, and 4. Linscotts’ Lack of Compliance,

are based upon speculation, conjecture, guesses,

misinterpretation, and/or misrepresentation, and most
importantly, are all irrelevant to the Conditional Use Permit

Application and proceeding.

The assertions arise from attorney

Gary Allen’s March 15, 2019 letter (starting at Exhibits R. p.

550/Agency R. p. 538, but out of order in the record) with
volumes of attachments submitted to Bonner County just a few days

prior to the March 22, 2019 reconsideration hearing.

Those

assertions are made by persons without knowledge and are

irrelevant to the Conditional Use Permit Application and approval
at issue herein.

Due to the process used for considering the application and
the timing of CITIZENS AGAINST’s submittals, the factual record

regarding all the specifics for the decades of operations by
Intervenor LINSCOTTS has not been developed.
INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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establishes that the Intervenor LINSCOTTS operate “an active pit”
as required by Bonner County Revised Code within which to site an

asphalt batch plant pursuant to conditional use permit.
INTERSTATE has operated an asphalt batch plant upon the

LINSCOTT’S real property which is subject to the Conditional Use
Permit Application periodically, pursuant to approved Special Use
INTERSTATE is

Permits (Exhibits R. p 8—23/Agency R. p. 1—16).

seeking approval to permanently locate an asphalt batch plant in
the existing and active LINSCOTT’S gravel pit.

The December 11, 2018 appeal letter (Exhibits R. p. 1129—

1135/Agency R. p. 1115-1121) is not executed by anyone identified
or duly appointed as Manager of Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST, an

entity pursuant to Idaho law.
The January 24, 2019 reconsideration letter (Exhibits R. p.

1039—1128/Agency R. p. 1025—1114) is not signed by anyone.

It is

does not identify anyone duly appointed as Manager of Appellant

CITIZENS AGAINST, an entity pursuant to Idaho law.

On March 15,

2019, attorney Gary Allen submitted a letter on “behalf of

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant.”

The letter

does not identify any manager of Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST.
The CITIZENS AGAINST entity does not own any real property,

whether in the vicinity of the proposed asphalt plant or anywhere
else.

The purported members of CITIZENS AGAINST are not parties

to this judicial review and have not asserted any matters in

their respective own rights.

INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
The LINSCOTTS as Respondents assert additional issues on

appeal ari sing from the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST’s Petitioner’s

Opening Br ief, as follows:
(a)

May the validity of an ordinance be challenged in a
judicial review of a land use application?

(b)

May an after the fact stipulated declaratory relief
judgment be the basis to overturn a judicial review
decision?

(C)

May an after the fact stipulated declaratory relief
judgment invalidating an ordinance affect a prior
application and the rights established in favor of
Intervenor Linscotts?

(d)

If relevant to the inquiry, does the doctrine of
diminishing assets apply to the Intervenor Linscotts’
gravel pit?

(e)

Has Petitioner Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate
Asphalt Plant shown any prejudice to a substantial
right?

The LINSCOTTS assert additional issues on appeal as Cross

Appellants

,

as follows:

(a)

Did the District Court err in finding and concluding
that the Petitioner Citizens Against
Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant is an affected person
pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-6521 (which means one
having a bona fide interest in real property which may
be adversely affected)?

(b)

Did the District Court err in finding and concluding
that the Petitioner Citizens Against
Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant has standing contrary
to Idaho Code § 30—27—105 (effective July 1,
2015)(which amends to provide an unincorporated
association is an entity separate and distinct from its
members)?

(C)

Did the District Court err in finding and concluding
that the Petitioner Citizens Against
Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant timely filed within
28 days?

(d)

Did the District Court err in finding and concluding
that the Petitioner Citizens Against
Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant’s rejected filing was

INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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timely resubmitted in the electronic filing system?
(e)

Did the District Court err in finding and concluding
that the Petitioner Citizens Against
Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant did not have to serve
its petition on the landowner applicants Linscotts?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST did not seek an award of attorney
fees against the Intervenor LINSCOTTS below or on appeal.

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST is not entitled to recover any
attorney fees against the Intervenor LINSCOTTS.
The Intervenor LINSCOTTS, based upon existing Idaho case
law, are not able to seek an award of attorney fees in this

matter against the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST for acting without
a reasonable basis in fact or law pursuant to Idaho Code § 12—117

or for acting frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation

pursuant to § 12—121.

INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW - Local Land Use Planning Act and
Administrative Procedures Act

Pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code §
67-6521 ACTIONS BY AFFECTED PERSONS, provides in relevant part,
as follows:
(1)(a) As used herein, an affected person shall mean
one having a bona fide interest in real property which may
be adversely affected by:
The approval, denial or failure to act
(i)
upon an application for a subdivision, variance,
special
use
permit
and
such
other
similar
applications required or authorized pursuant to this
chapter;
***
[***] An affected person aggrieved by a final
(d)
decision concerning matters identified in section £1;
6521(1)(a), Idaho Code, may within twenty—eight (28) days
after all remedies have been exhausted under local
ordinances seek judicial review as provided by chaEter 52,
title 67, Idaho Code.

Also, the Local Land Use Planning Act, in Idaho Code § 67—
6535 APPROVAL OR DENIAL OF ANY APPLICATION TO BE BASED UPON

EXPRESS STANDARDS AND T0 BE IN WRITING, provides as follows:
The
approval or denial of any application
(1)
required or authorized pursuant to this chapter shall be
based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth
in the comprehensive plan,
zoning ordinance or other
appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or county.
Such approval standards and criteria shall be set forth in
express terms in land use ordinances in order that permit
applicants, interested residents and decision makers alike
may know the express standards that must be met in order
to obtain a requested permit or approval. Whenever the
nature of any decision standard or criterion allows, the
of
shall
or
compliance
decision
aspects
identify
noncompliance
with
relevant
approval
standards
and
criteria in the written decision.
The
approval or denial of any application
(2)
required or authorized pursuant to this chapter shall be
in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that
explains the criteria and standards considered relevant,
states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and
explains the rationale for the decision based on the
applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant
pertinent
ordinance
and
provisions,
statutory
INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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information
principles
constitutional
and
factual
contained in the record.
Failure to identify the nature of compliance or
(a)
noncompliance with express approval standards or failure
to explain compliance or noncompliance with relevant
decision criteria shall be grounds for invalidation of an
approved permit or site—specific authorization, or denial
of same, on appeal.
or
seeking
applicant
person
affected
Any
(b)
judicial review of compliance with the provisions of this
section must first seek reconsideration of the final
decision within fourteen (14) days. Such written request
must identify specific deficiencies in the decision for
which reconsideration is sought. Upon reconsideration, the
decision may be affirmed, reversed or modified after
compliance with applicable procedural standards. A written
decision shall be provided to the applicant or affected
person within sixty (60) days of receipt of the request
for reconsideration or the request, is deemed. denied” A
decision shall not be deemed final for purposes of
judicial review unless the process required in this
subsection has been followed. The twenty—eight (28) day
time frame for seeking judicial review is tolled until the
date of the written decision regarding reconsideration or
the expiration of the sixty
day reconsideration
(60)
period, whichever occurs first.
It is the intent of the legislature that
(3)
decisions made pursuant to this chapter should be founded
upon sound reason and practical application of recognized
principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts
of the state are directed to consider the proceedings as a
whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and
resultant decisions in light of practical considerations
with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the
essentials of reasoned decision making. Only those whose
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or
violation of fundamental rights, not the mere possibility
thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of a
decision. Every final decision rendered concerning a site—
specific land use request shall provide or be accompanied
by notice to the applicant regarding the applicant's right
to request a regulatory taking analysis pursuant to
section 67-8003, Idaho Code. An applicant denied an
application or aggrieved by a final decision concerning
matters identified in section 67—6521(1)(a), Idaho Code,
may, within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have
been exhausted under local ordinance, seek judicial review
under the procedures provided by chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code. An appeal shall be from the final decision and
not limited to issues raised in the request for
reconsideration.
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, in I.C. § 67—5273

TIME FOR FILING PETITION FOR REVIEW, provides in relevant part as
INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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follows:
***

A petition for judicial review of a final agency
(3)
action other than a rule or order must be filed within
twenty—eight (28) days of the agency action, except as
provided by other provision of law. The time for filing a
petition for review shall be extended during the pendency
petitioner’s
of
the
exhaust
attempts
to
timely
administrative remedies, if the attempts are clearly not
frivolous or repetitious. A cross—petition for judicial
review may be filed within fourteen (14) days after a
party is served with a copy of the notice of the petition
for judicial review.
For a timely filed petition for judicial review, by an

affected person (one having a bona fide interest in real

property which may be adversely affected by the decision), the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, in Idaho Code § 67—5279
SCOPE OF REVIEW

—

TYPE OF RELIEF, provides in relevant part, as

follows:
(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact.

***
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of
this chapter or by other provisions of law to issue an
order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless the
court finds that the agency's findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the
statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful
procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
of discretion. If the agency action is not affirmed, it
shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for
further proceedings as necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2)
and (3) of this section, agency action shall be affirmed
unless substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced.

As set forth in Sanders Orchard v. Gem County ex rel. Bd. of

County Com'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 698 (2002) the standard for a

reviewing Court is stated as follows:
This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of
INTERVENORS’ RESPONDENTS’ AND CROSS APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
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the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. Id.;
IDAHO CODE § 67-5279(1) (2001). Rather, this Court defers
to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly
Price v. Payette County Board of County
erroneous.
There is
Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426, 958 P.2d 583 (1998).
a strong presumption of favoring the validity of the actions
of zoning boards, which includes the application and
interpretation of their own zoning ordinances. Rural
Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 133 Idaho
The Board's zoning decision may
833, 993 P.2d 596 (1999).
be overturned only where it: (a) violates statutory or
constitutional provisions; (b) exceeds the agency's
statutory authority; (c) was made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record
as a whole; or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
Price v. Payette County Board of County
discretion.
Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426, 958 P.2d 583 (1998); IDAHO
In addition, the Board's zoning
CODE § 67-5279(3) (2001).
decision must be upheld if substantial rights of the
appellant have not been prejudiced.
Payette River Prop.
Owners Ass'n v. Board of Commissioners, 132 Idaho 551, 976
P.2d 477 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 67—5279(4) (2001).

Idaho Code § 67-5279 (1),

(3),

and

(4)

as recited and set

forth above apply to this action, in addition to the strong

presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning
boards, which includes the application and interpretation of

their own zoning ordinances.

With that presumption, the

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST, an entity, must show that the
Respondent BONNER COUNTY’S approval of the conditional use permit

prejudiced the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST’s substantial rights
(based upon a bona fide interest in real property as required

by Idaho Code § 67-6521) as required by Idaho Code § 67—5279(4)
and that the Respondent BONNER COUNTY’S actions fall within the
standards set forth in Idaho Code § 67—5279(3)(a) through (e).

II.

ARGUMENTS BY REFERENCE
Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(h), the Intervenors LINSCOTTS as

Respondents and as Cross Appellants adopt by reference the
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arguments set forth in the briefs filed by the Respondent and
Cross Appellant BONNER COUNTY and the Intervenor as Respondent

and Cross Appellant INTERSTATE, respectively, rather than being
set forth in herein.

III. LINSCOTTS’ ARGUMENTS AS RESPONDENTS
A.

The Validity Of An Ordinance (Declaratory Relief) May
Not Be Challenged In A Judicial Review Of A Decision On
A Land Use Application

In Euclid Ave. Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 307—8
(2008), the Idaho Supreme Court considered “[]whether an

administrative appeal and a civil action may be combined in one
proceeding.

We hold that the two may not be combined and that

this Court will review the appeal in accordance with the

standards applicable to the filing fee category designated on the
initial filing in the trial court.”

The Court in reaching the

decision stated as follows:
The separation of civil actions and administrative
appeals is supported by good policy underpinnings. After
all, one proceeding is appellate in nature and the other is
an original action.
They are processed differently by our
courts.
Discovery is rarely available in a judicial review
The review is to be conducted on the record,
proceeding.
absent specific authorization. I.C. § 67-5276. The
standards for determining an outcome are specified by
statute (I.C. § 67—5279), whereas this is not the case with
The
actions seeking declaratory or monetary relief.
confusion resulting from a conglomerated proceeding is
apparent here. While Euclid primarily styled this as a
proceeding seeking judicial review, the matter was
determined upon three orders granting summary judgment,
hardly what one would expect in a review on the record.
Thus, we are constrained to hold that actions seeking civil
damages or declaratory relief may not be combined with
petitions for judicial review under IDAPA.

Euclid Ave., 146 Idaho at 309.
The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST seek to challenge the
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validity of a Bonner County Ordinance amending Bonner County

Revised Code, which is the subject matter of the application by
LINSCOTTS and INTERSTATE and the approval by BONNER COUNTY.

The

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST now agrees that the District Court was
correct in ruling that a declaratory relief action may not be

combined with a petition for judicial review, but seeks to argue
that in a petition for judicial review a reviewing Court may

conclude that an ordinance is invalid.

As indicated above, a

petition for judicial review is appellate in nature, without
discovery and based upon a review on the record (which here is
the application of the ordinance to the specific application made

pursuant to the ordinance).

A challenge to the adoption of an

ordinance is an original court action, including discovery,

presentation of facts and argument of law, whether in a trial or
summary judgment proceeding.
B.

An After The Fact Stipulated Declaratory Relief
Judgment May Not Be The Basis To Overturn A Judicial
Review Decision

The Appellants CITIZENS AGAINST in 2019 did not pursue any

declaratory relief action challenging the ordinance and rather
sought to impermissibly challenge the adoption of any ordinance
in the judicial review it filed regarding the conditional use

permit approval.

Following the District Court’s decision and

commencement of this further appeal, the Appellant CITIZENS

AGAINST seeks to append to its opening brief documents consisting
of a stipulation, order, and judgment from a later filed

declaratory relief action in 2020. As set forth above, a petition
for judicial review is an appellate process, as is a further

appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.

The review is limited to the
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record before the agency, except for narrow circumstances. Idaho
Code 67—5273 through 67—5279.

None of the circumstances apply to

this matter.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84. Judicial Review Of Agency

Actions by the District Court,
(1)

Method of Review,

(A)

(e)

Method and Scope of Review,

Existing Record Only, provides “[w]hen

judicial review is authorized by statute but the statute does not

provide the procedure or stand for judicial review, judicial
review of agency action must be based upon the record created

before the agency.”
Idaho 854, 856—7

See generally Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133

(Ct.

App. 2000)(judicial review is an appellate

capacity review of County’s quasi—judicial property specific land
use decisions).
The materials appended to the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST’s

Petitioner’s Opening Brief are not part of the record for review,
have not been properly made a part of the record for review, and

should be disregarded.
C.

An After The Fact Stipulated Declaratory Relief
Judgment Invalidating An Ordinance May Not Affect The
Prior Application And The Rights Established In Favor
Of Intervenor Linscotts

In the event the Court considers the after the fact, outside

the record, stipulated order and judgment invalidating the

amendment ordinance, such an invalidation may not affect the
LINSCOTT’S rights established by the application under the Bonner

County Revised Code then in effect and the decision approving the
conditional use permit for their specific property.
In the case of Hillman v. City of Pocatello, 74 Idaho 69,

71—72,

(Idaho 1953), relied upon the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST
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for the proposition that an invalid ordinance is always invalid,
the Court recognized that rights can be afforded under the

ordinance prior to its declaration as invalid.

In that action,

the Court found that “Subsequent to the enactment of the

ordinance in question, there were no rights established or rights
of third parties affected, or any detriment to others shown by
the jurisdiction which the City exercised over the land in

question.

In this respect the facts before us differ from those

presented in Canady v. Coeur d'Alene Lbr. Co., 21 Idaho 77.”
In Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595

(Idaho 1968), the Idaho Supreme Court, in considering the rights

of an applicant pursuant to a building permit application, held

that a subsequently adopted rezoning did not affect the rights of
the applicant.

The Court considered the weight of authority from

other jurisdictions that vest rights based upon an application

made on existing ordinances and code.
In this matter, the Intervenors LINSCOTTS and the Intervenor

INTERSTATE applied under the existing Bonner County Revised Code
in effect at the time.

There was no then pending challenge to

the ordinance amending the code, and there was no adjudication

declaring the ordinance amending the code or any part of the code
invalid.

The Intervenors LINSCOTTS and Intervenor INTERSTATE

have expended substantial time, energy, and financial resources
in preparing, making, and defending their application and the

approval obtained.

The Intervenors LINSCOTTS have rights

established by the application made under the code then in
effect, which may not be impacted by the subsequently initiated

and subsequently stipulated judgment invalidating the underlying
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ordinance amending the code.
The conclusory statement by the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST
on page 22 of the Petitioner’s Opening Brief that every decision

based upon an ordinance later declared invalid are also invalid
is not supported by any citation to authority and is contrary to

the vested rights afforded an applicant.
D.

The Conditional Use Permit Standards Were Properly
Applied By Bonner County In Approving the Conditional
Use Permit

The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST also argues that the BONNER

COUNTY failed to properly act pursuant to the Bonner County

Revised Code provisions as amended by the 2018 Ordinance

Amendment in effect at the time.

The plain language of Bonner

County Revised Code § 12—336 being challenged by CITIZENS AGAINST
is the Resource Use Table note requirement that “22.

A Batch

Plant is conditionally permitted only within an active gravel
pit.”
The rules of statutory construction have been applied by

Idaho Court’s in review of the meaning and interpretation of

ordinance provisions adopted by local government.

As summarized

in Boswell v. Steele, 348 P.3d 497, 506 (Ct. App. 2015).

Such interpretation must begin with the literal words of the
statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a
whole. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho
889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). It is well established
that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative
history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted
for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of
the legislature. Id. Only where a statute is capable of more
than one conflicting construction is it said to be ambiguous
and invoke the rules of statutory construction. L & W Supply
Corp. v. Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 743, 4O P.3d
96, 101 (2002). If it is necessary for this Court to
interpret a statute because an ambiguity exists, then this
Court will attempt to ascertain legislative intent and, in
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construing the statute, may examine the language used, the
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the
policy behind the statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State
Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595
(2000). Where the language of a statute is ambiguous,
constructions that lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh
results are disfavored. See Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho
790, 798, 264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011).
In addition, as set forth above, there is a strong

presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning
boards, which includes the application and interpretation of

their own zoning ordinances.

Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Board

of Commissioners, 133 Idaho 833 (1999).
Here, the literal words of the Bonner County Revised Code

provision at issue must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning.

The provision requires “an active gravel pit.”

That

language and those words are unambiguous and not subject to

conflicting interpretation.

There has been more than a

sufficient showing that the Intervenor LINSCOTTS’ real property
is “an active gravel pit.”

It is irrelevant and immaterial to

any consideration of those words if the pit has been referred to
as a grandfathered pit or a legal, nonconforming pit, or by some

other designation.

The words control and the only requisite

showing is that it is “an active gravel pit.”

The analysis ends

there.

There has not been any actual factual record developed as to
any status of the Intervenor LINSCOTTS’ gravel pit other than

that it is active.

That is all that was required by the Bonner

County Revised Code provisions.

That is all that had been

submitted in support of the application.

For the sake of

argument, if this Court finds that the plain and unambiguous
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language of the Bonner County Revised Code provision necessitates

something further, a remand to develop the record as to the
aspects of the pit relevant under the provision would be
appropriate, rather than an outright reversal of the approval of
the CUP application.

Due process would require such a procedure.

In this instance, the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST seeks to

rely upon its biased interpretation and assertions of facts and

circumstances based upon incomplete records and information it
has generated, created, and/or misinterpreted, which are also

irrelevant to this matter.
The record clearly establishes that the real property in

which the batch plant is being located has continuously been
operated as a gravel pit for several decades, commencing long
before any Bonner County zoning ordinances.

The Appellant

CITIZENS AGAINST seeks to argue some limitation on the rights of
the Intervenors LINSCOTTS to continue to operate the pit.

The

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST seek to assert an acreage limitation
from an aerial photo in 1981 using ordinance language regarding

expansion from an ordinance adopted in 2008 (rather than acreage
from 2008).

The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST seek to compare a

feed lot program adding the number of cattle to a parcel of

property to the operation of a gravel pit, systematically
removing an extraction resource.

A gravel pit by its very nature is based upon the extraction
of the resource which does not replenish or regrow.

operation removes the available gravel.
is to remove all the gravel.

A gravel pit

The use of the property

A gravel pit is not reasonably

subjected to only being able to remove gravel from a limited area
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within the pit, because the gravel, once removed, does not
replenish or regenerate itself (compared to timber removal or
other crop removal, which grow back, for example).

The use on

the property is removal over time until the resource is depleted.

Although not adopted expressly in any case identified in
Idaho, most state Courts have adopted the “doctrine of

diminishing assets” as applicable to gravel pits or other mining
activities upon real property when faced with later enacted
zoning ordinances.

The doctrine was described and applied by the

Supreme Court of Washington in it decision in City of University
Place v. McGuire, 3O P.3d 453 (Wash. 2001)(a copy of which is in
the Clerk’s R. p. 246—253.

To summarize, under the doctrine, an

owner's pre—existing (legal nonconforming) mining use extends to
the boundaries of the parcel of land, and is a right vested in
the land, despite subsequent zoning limitations asserted.

This

is because the general principle that a nonconforming use will be

restricted to its original site does not match the realities of
extractive use such as mining.
If the use of the Intervenor LINSCOTTS’ pit is a proper

issue for consideration under the ordinance for the placement of
a batch plant (which as argued above, it is not), a proper record

needs developed as to the actual and continued use of the
property.

The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST’s unsubstantiated

opinions as to the use of the property is not an appropriate

method of consideration.

The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST’s self—

serving and unverified accusations lack proper foundation and
indices of accuracy and reliability.
As shown of record herein, the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST
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has made several assertions and arguments regarding the

Intervenor LINSCOTTS operation of the pit.

There are no

provisions in the applicable Bonner County Revised Code relevant
to this conditional use permit application which require the

Intervenor LINSCOTTS to make any showing other that the batch

plant will be located within an active gravel pit.

The only

thing that the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST in their volumes of

documents and assertions can clearly show is that the Intervenor
LINSCOTTS operate an active gravel pit.
The process by Respondent BONNER COUNTY on the application
for a conditional use permit and this petition for judicial

review are not the appropriate forum for a claimed challenge by
neighbors or the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST, to the Intervenor
LINSCOTTS’ operations of their gravel pit.

The approval or

denial of the conditional use permit application does not have
any bearing on the Intervenor LINSCOTTS continued operations of

their gravel pit.

The arguments and assertions in this matter

are irrelevant and should be disregarded.
E.

The Appellant Citizens Against Has Failed To Show Any
Prejudice To A Substantial Right

As shown of record herein, the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST
does not own any real property and is asserting issues and claims

not within the purview of the conditional use permit application
or jurisdiction of a petition for judicial review.

In addition,

any issues and claims asserted are all of a speculative nature

and not based upon actual identified prejudice to a substantial
right (of either the entity association, or its members
identified).
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The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST in its Petitioner’s Opening

Brief sets forth the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act standard
of review, including the requirement to show that a substantial

right has been prejudiced, but then does not make any argument in

support of any showing that a substantial right of CITIZENS

AGAINST has been prejudiced.
The required showing that substantial rights have been

prejudiced pursuant to Idaho Code § 67—5279(4) was thoroughly
reviewed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hawkins v. Bonneville
County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232 (2011), as follows:
The district court primarily rested its decision to
dismiss Hawkins' petition on the grounds that he had not
asserted any prejudice to a substantial right. Hawkins
argues that the Board prejudiced his substantial rights in
three general ways: (1) the Board, as a matter of law,
misapplied its variance policies by finding that the Meyers
had a grandfathered right to continue not complying with the
frontage ordinance; (2) new housing on the Meyers' land will
generate more traffic across his property, potentially
exceeding the scope of any easements there and increasing
the risk that his cattle will escape through an open gate;
and (3) emergency vehicles may not be able to reach the
Meyers' property in case of a fire.
The Board responds that
the decision to grant the variances merely allows the Meyers
to continue using the property for dwelling sites as they
always have, and since this does not generate any new risks
or burdens for Hawkins' property, his substantial rights
have not been prejudiced.

Regardless of whether the Board erred by granting
variances to the Meyers, Hawkins cannot prevail on his
petition for review unless he shows that the variances
"The party challenging
prejudice his substantial rights.
the decision of the Board must not only demonstrate that the
Board erred in a manner specified by I.C. § 67—5279(3) but
must also show that its substantial rights have been
prejudiced." Kirk—Hughes Dev., LLC v. Kootenai Cnty. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 149 Idaho 555, 557, 237 P.3d 652, 654 (2010)
(citing I.C. § 67—5279(4)).
The petitioner must show both an error under § 67—
5279(3) and prejudice under § 67—5279(4), but nothing in the
IAPA requires the courts to address these two requirements
in any particular order.
This Court may therefore affirm a
governing board's decision solely on the grounds that the
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petitioner has not shown prejudice to a substantial right.
See Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cnty. Planning & Zoning, 150
Idaho 231, 235—36, 245 P.3d 983, 987—88 (2010) (upholding a
conditional—use permit because the petitioner failed to
challenge the district court's adverse ruling regarding
substantial rights); Kirk—Hughes Dev., 149 Idaho at 558, 237
In other words, the Court may forego
P.3d at 655 (same).
analyzing whether the governing board erred in a manner
specified by I.C. § 67—5279(3) if the petitioner cannot show
that his or her substantial rights were violated.
We start by addressing Hawkins' first argument, which
is that the Board violated his substantial rights by
substantively misapplying its ordinances in granting
variances to the Meyers. This Court has not yet attempted
to articulate any universal rules to govern whether a

petitioner's substantial rights are being violated under
I.C. § 67—5279(4).
This, in part, is due to the fact that
each procedural irregularity, legal error, and discretionary
decision is different and can affect the petitioner in
varying ways. Compare Evans v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 137 Idaho
428, 433, 50 P.3d 443, 448 (2002) (finding no prejudice to
substantial rights when a county board visited a proposed
use site without notice), with Comer v. Cnty. of Twin Falls,
130 Idaho 433, 439, 942 P.2d 557, 563 (1997) (vacating a
county board's decision when it made a site visit without
notice).
Generally, as a procedural matter, all the parties
involved in a land—use decision have a substantial right to
Governing boards
a reasonably fair decision—making process.
owe procedural fairness not just to applicants but also
their interested opponents. Both should expect proceedings
that are free from procedural defects that might reasonably
have affected the final outcome.
See Noble v. Kootenai
Cnty., 148 Idaho 937, 942—43, 231 P.3d 1034, 1039—40 (2010)
(holding that, even though the county board disallowed the
public from participating in a site visit, doing so did not
likely affect the decision); Eacret v. Bonner Cnty., 139
Idaho 780, 787, 86 P.3d 494, 501 (2004) (vacating a county
board's decision due to a commissioner's likely bias). This
includes the right for all interested parties to have a
meaningful opportunity to present evidence to the governing
board on salient factual issues. Cnty. Residents Against
Pollution from Septage Sludge v. Bonner Cnty., 138 Idaho
585, 588—89, 67 P.3d 64, 67—68 (2003); Sanders Orchard v.
Gem Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 702,
52 P.3d 840, 847 (2002).

These cases align with the overarching due—process
principle that everyone with a statutory interest in the
outcome of a decision is entitled to meaningful notice and a
fair hearing before an impartial decision—maker. Eacret,
139 Idaho at 787, 86 P.3d at 501; see also Eddins v. City of
Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010) ("
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[D]ue process rights are substantial rights.").
Accordingly, the Legislature has provided that people who
are affected by land—use proceedings for the most part have
a statutory right to notice and for a chance to participate
in a hearing. E.g. I.C. § 67-6512(2) (requiring public
notice and hearing for special—use permits); id. § 67—6515
(planned—unit developments); id. § 67—6516 (variances).

Of course, assuming that a decision is procedurally
fair, applicants for a permit also have a substantial right
in having the governing board properly adjudicate their
applications by applying correct legal standards. Lane
Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175
P.3d 776, 780 (2007); cf. Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of
Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 842, 7O P.3d 669, 680 (2003)
(remanding because the agency misstated the relevant legal
standard and denied an application to transfer water
Landowner applicants, however, also have a
rights).
Terrazas
substantial right to develop their own property.
v. Blaine Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 198,
207 P.3d 169, 174 (2009).

On the other hand, when a petitioner opposes a
governing board's decision to grant a permit authorizing
development, as Hawkins has, the petitioner must still show,
not merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her
Since a party
substantial rights.
I.C. § 67—5279(4).
opposing a landowner's request for a development permit has
no substantial right in seeing someone else's application
adjudicated correctly, he or she must therefore show
something more. The petitioner opposing a permit must be in
jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project goes
forward, such as a reduction in the opponent's land value or
interference with his or her use or ownership of the land.
See Price v. Payette Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 131 Idaho
426, 431, 958 P.2d 583, 588 (1998) (vacating a board
decision because it could impact property value or the
petitioners' use and enjoyment of their land).
It would be
instructive to look to law relating to property rights,
nuisance, and trespass when determining if a substantial
right is at stake in a case such as this.
Thus, regarding Hawkins' first argument, it is not
enough that Hawkins may be able to show that the County
substantively misapplied its own ordinance. The Board does
not prejudice Hawkins' substantial rights merely by
incorrectly adjudicating someone else's application for a
variance.

Hawkins next argument is that allowing the Meyers to
rebuild the homes on their properties will overburden the
spur road and interfere with Hawkins' ranching activities.
To determine if this would violate Hawkins' substantial
rights, we begin by evaluating what the Board has allowed
the Meyers to do by granting their variance request. A
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variance is:
a modification of the bulk and placement requirements
of the ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width,
depth, front yard, side yard, rear yard, setbacks,
parking space, height of buildings, or other ordinance
provision affecting the size or shape of a structure or
the placement of the structure upon lots, or the size
of lots.

A variance, in short, merely allows the
I.C. § 67—6516.
landowner to avoid the "strict letter" of the zoning
ordinance's physical specifications. BCZBO § 1-511(2). When
it issued the variances in this case, the Board permitted
the Meyers to build dwellings on their properties without
complying with the frontage ordinance.
We acknowledge that it is possible for the Meyers to
begin using the spur road more often now that they have
variances allowing them to construct new houses. Hawkins,
however, cannot show prejudice to a substantial right
because no court has adjudicated the easement rights the
People have been living
Meyers might have in the spur road.
on the Meyers' land for decades and relying on the road to
There may be an easement across Hawkins'
reach their homes.
The fact that the
land benefiting the Meyers' parcels.
homes have been uninhabited for several years does not
necessarily terminate an easement, as nonuse alone does not
amount to abandonment— there must be an unequivocal and
intentional act to abandon. Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho
691, 698, 8 P.3d 1234, 1241 (2000), overruled on other
grounds by Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 230 P.3d 743
Further, there was evidence produced before the
(2010).
Board that the spur road may actually be a public right—of—
way, in which case Hawkins would have certainly suffered no
harm.

The extent of the Meyers' easement interests are
critical to determining whether the Board prejudiced
Hawkins' substantial rights, but the issue is not before
This suit is not a civil action, but a petition
this Court.
for judicial review under the IAPA.
Because this is a
petition for judicial review, the parties have neither
litigated the nature of the Meyers' easement rights, nor
would this be the proper setting to do so.
Instead, the
only matter at issue is the propriety of granting variances
The Board did not, and indeed could not,
to the Meyers.
grant the Meyers permission to enter Hawkins' land to use
the spur road or otherwise define the scope of the Meyers'
easement rights. The Board has no authority to adjudicate
easements.
Hawkins last argues that new dwellings on the Meyers'
land would be a fire hazard to his property because
emergency vehicles may not be able to reach the Meyers'
He contends that he, as a neighboring landowner, is
land.
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within a specific class of people the frontage ordinance was
intended to benefit. The frontage ordinance undoubtedly was
intended to ensure that residences are accessible from
public highways. Allowing the Meyers to construct new
homes, however, will not change the number of structures on
If anything,
the land adjoining Hawkins' property.
demolishing unattended houses and replacing them with new
homes built to modern safety codes will reduce the chance of
Hawkins has therefore not shown any prejudice to a
fire.
substantial right. Without such a showing, this Court must
affirm the district court's order dismissing the petition
for review. I.C. § 67-5279(4).
As succinctly summarized in Hungate v. Bonner Cty., 166
Idaho 388, 458 P.3d 966, 970 (2020) the Appellant CITIZENS

AGAINST to prevail upon a petition for judicial review “[] must
do two things to set the Board's decision aside:

(i)

establish

the Board erred in one of the ways specified in Idaho Code

section 67—5279(3); and

(ii)

show the decision has prejudiced the

Hungates' substantial rights.

Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232, 254

P.3d at 1228.”

Below the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST had made arguments
regarding prejudice to a substantial right asserting negative
impacts to aspects of its members real property (not any real

property owned by the entity CITIZENS AGAINST) based upon self—
serving, conclusory assertions.

The assertions of impact to

value, air quality, quiet enjoyment, and water quality, were each

addressed and rebutted in the proceeding and found to not be
prejudiced.

Even accepting that a “negative impact” results from

the grant of the CUP; that is not the same as prejudicing a

substantial right.

The assertions of negative impacts do not

rise to the level of prejudicing a substantial right.
The Hawkins case and Hungate case are controlling and the

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST did not make a showing of prejudice to
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a substantial right.

Mere allegations are insufficient.

The

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST has failed to “show something more” as
required by the Hawkins case.

Similar to the Hungate case, the

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST failed to show how conditionally
permitting a batch plant in an active gravel pit, where temporary
batch plant operations have repeatedly occurred for many years
results in a substantial right being prejudiced.

The Appellant

CITIZENS AGAINST is not in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm

by the operation of a batch plant pursuant to the conditional use
permit with the conditions attached to it.

There has been no

actual showing of a reduction in the alleged member’s land value
or interference with the alleged member’s use or ownership of

their land.
The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST has failed to make a showing

pursuant to Idaho Code § 67—5279(4) that there is any prejudice
to a substantial right and the decision approving the conditional

use permit should be affirmed.

IV.

LINSCOTTS’ ARGUMENTS AS CROSS APPELLANTS
A.

The Appellant Citizens Against Is Not An Affected
Person And Lacks Standing To Bring This Judicial Review

In 2015, Idaho adopted entity status for unincorporated

nonprofit associations.

Idaho Code Title 30, Chapter 27 contains

the Idaho Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act, which

was added in 2015 to the Corporations Title 30 as part of the
Idaho Uniform Business Organizations Code reorganization and

replacement of the then various statutory provisions in effect.
The new code provisions regarding unincorporated nonprofit
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associations moved the statutory framework from that of

partnership to that of an entity.

The record reflects that the

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST was created in response to the
conditional use permit application in this matter, which was
after the new code came into effect.
Idaho Code § 30-27-102 Definitions provides “(a) In this
chapter:

...

(5)

‘Unincorporated nonprofit association’ means

an unincorporated organization consisting of two

(2)

or more

members joined under an agreement that is oral, in a record,
or implied from conduct for one

(1)

or more common, nonprofit

purposes.[...}” and provides certain exclusions which are not
relevant to this matter.

Idaho Code § 30—27—105(a) provides

that “[a]n unincorporated association is an entity distinct

from its members and managers.” (emphasis added).

The

provisions of Idaho Code Title 30, Chapter 27 adopted in 2015
are a “NEW PART” of Idaho Code, enacted in S.L. 2015 Ch. 243,
Sec.

53, p.

897.

The prior provisions of the Uniform

Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act contained in Idaho
Code Title 53, Chapter
Sec.

4,

p.

7

were repealed in S.L. 2015 Ch. 251,

1047.

The prior provisions applicable to unincorporated

nonprofit associations were based upon a partnership basis,
rather than entity basis.

The prior provisions statutorily

provided for “associational” standing based upon a claim held
by a member(s) of a nonprofit unincorporated association
(former I.C. § 53—707).

The 2015 statutory enactments

repealed and wholly replaced those provisions with the entity
form, including as applicable to standing.
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itself under the new statutory scheme must have standing

independent from its member(s), and cannot merely assert the

A member, in the

claims or potential claims of a member.

member’s own right, must assert its own claim.
The other statutory provisions of Title 30, Chapter 27

which came into effect in 2015 make it clear that a non—profit
association is not merely its members or managers, but is
separate and distinct.

The association is an entity, with its

own independent powers and purpose.

The association may own

and transfer real property, and has liability independent of
any liability of its members or managers.

The association may

sue or be sued in its own name and judgment is rendered in

favor of, or against, the entity, not its members or managers.

Service of process upon an association, does not subject its

members or managers to the action, and an action does not
abate due to a change in members or managers.

Members of an

association, are not an agent for the association based upon

being a member.

As with other forms of entities in Idaho, an

unincorporated association is a separate and distinct entity.
Under the statutory scheme enacted in 2015, an unincorporated

non—profit association must have its own non—profit purpose
and must have its own non—profit standing to pursue a petition
for judicial review or an action in the Courts of the State of
Idaho.

The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST does not itself own any
real property in Bonner County, Idaho.

The Appellant CITIZENS

AGAINST is 223 an “affected person” as defined by I.C. § 67—
6521(1)(a) as it does not have a bona fide interest in real
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property which may be adversely affected by the approval of
the conditional use permit.

Standing focuses upon the party

seeking relief and not on the issues that the party wants to

Standing requires particularized harm or

have adjudicated.

The Appellant

injury, not general to members of the public.

CITIZENS AGAINST does not have any standing to bring this
judicial review.

See Boundary Backpackers et a1. v. Boundary

Countx, 128 Idaho 371 (1996)(unincorporated association lacked

standing, individual plaintiff himself had standing); Fort Hall

Water Users Ass'n v. United States, 129 Idaho 39
(1996)(association lacked standing under statute which required
ownership); Selkirk—Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rel.
Batt, 128 Idaho 831

(1996)(standing requires injury in fact that

is not suffered alike by all citizens); Compare In re Jerome

County Bd. of Com'rs, 153 Idaho 298 (2012)(finding
“associational” standing based upon member’s ownership of real
estate, issued under the prior statute and its standing

provision, before replacement in 2015 regarding entity status

independent from members).
Here, it is irrelevant if any of the members

(or even any

identifiable managers) have an interest in real property, as
the entity association is separate and distinct from its

members and managers pursuant to the 2015 statutory
enactments.

The prior statutory provision providing for

standing of the association based upon claims held by its

members has been repealed and replaced in 2015.

Standing must

be established for the named Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST, which
in this matter is only the association.

None of the property
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owner members are a petitioner nor an appellant in this
judicial review (compared to the typical prudent practice

usually employed to name the complaining members as parties
themselves to a judicial review).
B.

Citizens Against Did Not Timely Seek Judicial Review
1.

The Petition Was Not Filed Within 28 Days

Three statutory provisions apply to the timeliness of

seeking judicial review of the Bonner County Board of County

Commissioners decision upon the Conditional Use Permit

Application at issue in this action, specifically I.C. § 67—
6521(d), I.C. § 67-6535(2)(b), and I.C. § 67-5273, which are set

forth above.

The Local Land Use Planning Act contains I.C. § 67—

6521(d) and I.C. § 67—6535(2)(b), and the Idaho Administrative

Procedure Act contains I.C. § 67-5273.

Each contain the 28 day

statute of limitations for filing a petition for judicial review,

but the language regarding reconsideration or exhausting
administrative remedies is worded slightly different in each.

When the statutory provisions are read in concert and in light of
the applicable case law, it is clear that the 28 day period is

only stayed or tolled by any attempts to exhaust administrative
remedies.

Attempts to exhaust administrative remedies do not

start anew a 28 day appeal period to seek judicial review.
Idaho Code I.C. § 67—6521(1)(d) provides that an affected

person “may within twenty—eight

(28)

days after all remedies have

been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review as

provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code.”
to the filing provisions of I.C.

The reference is

67—5273 which provides that the

petition “must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the
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agency action, except as provided by other provision of law.
The time for filing a petition for review shall be extended

during the pendency of the petitioner’s timely attempts to
exhaust administrative remedies, if the attempts are clearly
not frivolous or repetitious.”
(2)(b)

This provision in subsection

applies to specific reconsideration subject matter set

forth in the statute and does not otherwise provide automatic

authority for a reconsideration procedure before the local
jurisdiction.

Idaho Code § 67—6535(2)(b) provides that “The twenty—eight
(28)

day time frame for seeking judicial review is tolled

until the date of the written decision regarding

reconsideration or the expiration of the sixty

(60)

day

reconsideration period, whichever occurs first.”
Idaho Code I.C. § 67—6521(1)(d) was analyzed in Arthur v.

Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854 (Ct. App. 2000) to determine

whether a motion for reconsideration tolled the period for
judicial review.

It is clear from the language and the statutory

interpretation by the Court that the 28 day period commences to
run from the decision letter date of the Board of County

Commissioners’ decision on the application and that any

exhausting of administrative remedies tolls (or stays) the 28 day
period.

The exhausting of administrative remedies does not reset

or restart a new 28 day period.

This means that during the time

between the seeking of reconsideration and the decision on
reconsideration, the 28 days does not continue to run, and is
tolled.

The 28 days thence continues to run from the decision on

reconsideration (or from 60 days of inaction on the
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reconsideration).

The remaining number of days within which to

file a petition for judicial review is 28 days from that point,
less the number of day which passed prior to the request for

reconsideration.
In this matter, the Board of County Commissioner’s decision

on the appeal was issued in the January 14, 2019 letter.

The

request for reconsideration was made on and received by the

Bonner County Planning Department on January 24, 2019, which was
the 10m day of the 28 day appeal statute of limitations.

The

Board of County Commissioner’s decision on the reconsideration
was issued in the March 25, 2019 letter, which is the day the 28

appeal period continues to run from.

In this matter, the

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST only had 18 days remaining within
which to file its petition for judicial review, which ran on
Friday, April 12, 2019.

The appeal period is only tolled; it is

not terminated by seeking administrative remedies and it does not
run anew from the decision on reconsideration.
The earliest attempt by Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST to file a

petition for judicial review was Friday, April 19, 2019, after
the 28 days (as tolled) had expired.

As set forth below, the

actual petition for judicial review was not filed until May
2019, and it did not relate back to April 19, 2019.
19,

1,

If the April

2019 attempted filing would have been accepted, it was

untimely.

The May 1, 2019 filing date, which was accepted, is

likewise, untimely.
2.

The Petition Filing Does Not Relate Back

The Idaho Court electronic filing system in the District

Court relevant to this matter operated under the Rule
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—

Electronic Filing And Electronic Service, pursuant to the In Re:
Order Amending Rule On Electronic Filing And Service, effective
April 30, 2018 (which was replaced by the Idaho Rules For

Electronic Filing And Service, effective July

2019).

1,

During

this time period, the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST attempted to

file a petition for judicial review on April 19, 2019.
The Rule, part (e)1.A. and B. provide that a document is not

filed until accepted.

The Rule, part (e)4.A. provides that if a

document is not accepted, the system shall notify the filer

explaining the rejection and request correction and resubmission

by the filer.

The Rule, part (e)4.B. provides for the required

mandatory steps that must be undertaken to resubmit within 3
business days.
As shown by Court’s system, on Friday April 19, 2019, at
2:36 p.m. PST, user garyallen@givenspursley.com, by Envelope No.

1703359 submitted a document identified as a Petition For

Judicial Review on behalf of CITIZENS AGAINST.

The Clerk of

Court rejected the submittal on Monday April 22, 2019 with
directions for copying the envelope, correcting, and resubmitting
to retain the original filing date, pursuant to the rule in

effect.

Said rejection notice, pursuant to the rule, was emailed

by the system to the filer, user garyallen@givenspursley.com
(iCourt filing system).

The Appellant’s counsel acknowledged

receipt of the rejection notice to the filer user per the Rule
(Clerk’s R. p.

61 paragraph 8, p.

76—77 Exhibit B).

The submittals by Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST in its

justification for failing to follow the 3 day copy and resubmit

provision of the rule do not set forth any grounds to grant
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relief from the Rule.

Further, the submittals do not support any

A description of

relief under the Rule, part (e)5. A., B., or C.

asserted facts of steps taken and even technical problems are

wholly deficient and do not give rise to relief from the Rule.
There is no explanation of anything actually taking place.

There

is no showing of any actual steps taken to attempt to file or

refile after April 19, 2019 and before May

On May

1,

2019.

1,

2019, at 12:03 p.m. PST, user

garyallen@givenspursley.com, by iCourt Envelope No. 1716343

submitted a Petition For Judicial Review on behalf of CITIZENS
AGAINST, which was accepted on May

thereby filed on May

1,

1,

2019 at 1:36 p.m. PST, and

2019 (iCourt filing system).

Said filing

is clearly beyond any 28 day period (whether pursuant to the

tolling provisions for exhausting administrative remedies or 28
days running anew from the decision on reconsideration on March
24, 2019).

There was no timely filing of a petition for judicial review
for this matter.
C.

Citizens Against Failed To Serve Linscotts (Parties To
the Proceeding) And There Is No Jurisdiction For Relief
Negatively Affecting The Linscotts’ Application Rights

As shown of record herein, the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST

did not attempted to serve a copy of the petition for judicial
review on LINSCOTTS (or INTERSTATE).

No attempts were made and

no service was made after the failure was pointed out to CITIZENS

AGAINST.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(d). Serving the

Petition provides that “When the petition for judicial review is
filed, the petitioner Egg; serve copies ... upon the agency whose

action will be reviewed Egg all other parties to the proceeding
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before the agency (if there were parties to the proceeding).
Proof of service on the agency and all parties must be filed with
the court as required by Rule 5(e).”

“must” is mandatory.

The word

(emphasis added).

The word “and” requires other parties to

the proceeding (here LINSCOTTS and INTERSTATE)

to be served.

The service is easily accomplished, but there was not any

attempt to comply, even following the Respondent BONNER COUNTY
raising the issue and even after the District Court indicating
that the defect could be easily cured (Clerk’s R. p. 94—95).

Service is jurisdictional and required to obtain jurisdiction to

grant relief which affects a party.

The LINSCOTTS are the

landowner applicants granted the conditional use permit and are
parties to the proceedings on the conditional use permit

application before Bonner County.

While failure to take timely

steps in the process for judicial review is not jurisdictional,

service is jurisdictional when never completed and when not even

timely attempted.

Timeliness is certainly a factor.

service is required to have jurisdiction.

Timely

There was no timely

action by the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST to serve the LINSCOTTS
(who are Intervenors who raised the issue by special appearance)

(Clerk’s R. p.

97—99).

The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST had more

than sufficient notice that service is required and that lack of

service was an issue.

As there has been no service, no relief

may be granted to Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST which affects the
Intervenor LINSCOTTS and their application regarding their real

property which received conditional use permit approval.
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V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND RELIEF SOUGHT BY LINSCOTTS
This appeal follows the District Court’s appellate review

decision on the petition for judicial review.

Several issues

arose before the District Court regarding the petition for

judicial review, some jurisdictional, some procedural and some
substantive.

As it relates to affecting the rights of the

Intervenor LINSCOTTS, to commence the judicial review, the

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST itself and not its unnamed members had
to own real property which may be adversely affected by the

conditional use permit approval.

The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST

does not own any real property.
If the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST is deemed to have standing,

next, the Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST must timely seek relief by

filing a petition for judicial review.

The Appellant CITIZENS

AGAINST did not within 28 days of the decision, appropriately
applying the tolling provisions, file a petition for judicial
review (assuming for argument the filing is recognized to have

occurred on the rejection date in April).

In addition, the May

filing did not relate back under the electronic filing rule, and
there was no showing for relief from the provisions of the rule.
The filing was submitted, the clerk issued a rejection, the

rejection was received by counsel/filer and there is no evidence
as to any specific step taken (date, conduct, contacts)

to remedy

the rejection.
If the filing is deemed timely, to affect the Intervenors

LINSCOTTS’ rights under the application, the Appellant CITIZENS

AGAINST must effectuate service of process upon the LINSCOTTS.
initial service was done and after the issue was raised, no
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No

service was done to cure the deficiency.

The Intervenors

LINSCOTTS appeared by special appearance in this matter preserving
the issue.
If the failure to serve is disregarded, substantively, the

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST cannot challenge the ordinance which
amended Bonner County Revised Code in a judicial review.

With the

failure to properly challenge the ordinance before proceeding with
the judicial review, the record on the application must stand,

with the code in place.

In addition, the Intervenor LINSCOTTS

have rights based upon the application made under the ordinance as

written and not at that time subject to any challenge.
To challenge the decision by Respondent BONNER COUNTY, the

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST must meet one of two showings, a
violation as enumerated in I.C. § 67-5279(3) Egg that substantial
rights have been prejudiced.

The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST made

no showing below and did not even argue any substantial rights

have been prejudiced upon this appeal.

The Appellant CITIZENS

AGAINST has failed to set forth arguments within the scope of
this judicial review and upon the record and proceedings to make
a showing pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5279(3)

that the approval

of the conditional use permit was:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

in v;o}ation of constitutional or statutory
prov131ons;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon unlawful procedure;
not supported by substantial evidence on the record
as a whole; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Substantively, the interpretation and application of the

Bonner County Revised Code at issue was proper and the approval of
the conditional use permit is entitled to the strong presumption
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of validity in these matters.
In this appeal from the decision of the District Court, the

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST are simply asking this Court to second—
guess the District Court’s decision on the substantive approval

pursuant to the Bonner County Revised Code in effect.

The

Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST is also seeking to backdoor a challenge
to the ordinance which is outside the record, after the

proceedings were held, and after the District Court decision
issued.

Such a challenge is not appropriate in an appellate

capacity review and decision process of Bonner County’s quasi—
judicial decision on a site specific land use application.

In

addition, such a challenge may not affect the Intervenor applicant

LINSCOTT’s rights.
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CONCLUSION
The approval by the Respondent BONNER COUNTY of the

Intervenor LINSCOTTS’ Conditional Use Permit application should

be affirmed.

The Appellant CITIZENS AGAINST lacks standing,

failed to timely file for judicial review, failed to timely serve
the applicant/landowner LINSCOTTS, has failed to make the

showings required by Idaho Code § 67—5279(3), has failed to show

prejudice to substantial rights required by Idaho Code § 67—
5279(4), and has failed to overcome the strong presumption of

favoring the validity of the actions of zoning boards, which
includes the application and interpretation of their own zoning
ordinances.

A consideration of the proceedings as a whole,

evaluated in light of practical considerations, with an
emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of

reasoned decision making, results in the conditional use

permit approval being affirmed, on any number of the above
grounds.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

l

day of August, 2020.

‘ﬁ/ﬂ’ﬂ/
q¢HN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.
Attorney for Intervenors,
Respondents, Cross Appellants
LINSCOTTS
.
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Gary G. Allen
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Givens Pursley LLP
Boise, Idaho
iCourt Service Contacts:
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jackre1f@givenspursely.com

William S. Wilson
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iCourt Service Contact:
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iCourt Service Contact:
eat@winstoncashatt.com
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